



Ever since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced that a
government regulation that went "too far" was a taking that re-
quired just compensation,' the Supreme Court has grappled
with the appropriate analytical framework for determining
when the government has effected a regulatory taking. In most
cases, the question turns on whether the Court should apply a
per se rule or a balancing test.
Generally, the Court chooses to follow the balancing test es-
tablished in Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City.2
Courts applying the Penn Central test analyze a few factors to
determine whether the government action amounted to a tak-
ing.3 Occasionally, however, the Court will determine that a cer-
tain regulatory action always leads to a taking. In Lucas v South
Carolina Coastal Council,4 the Supreme Court established a per
se rule that any government regulation that completely elimi-
nates the value of a person's property is a taking5
Lucas left many questions about the scope of its new rule
unanswered.6 The Court revisited this issue in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
holding that a moratorium that eliminated the use of property
for six years was not subject to the Lucas rule.8 The Court ruled
that the Lucas approach comes into play only when the depriva-
tion of value is permanent.9 Thus, in situations in which the
t BA 2009, University of California, Los Angeles; JD Candidate 2014, The Univer-
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1 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415 (1922).
2 438US104(1978).
3 See Part I.B.1.
4 505 US 1003 (1992).
5 See id at 1019.
6 See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web
of Expectations, 45 Stan L Rev 1369, 1392 (1993).
7 535 US 302 (2002).
8 See id at 332.
9 See id.
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government regulation only temporarily eliminates all beneficial
value, courts are to apply the Penn Central balancing test to de-
termine whether there has been a taking.o
While Tahoe-Sierra dramatically narrowed the Lucas rule,"
it did not resolve whether Lucas applies only to the permanent
economic devaluation of a fee simple or whether there are other
scenarios in which a Lucas claim may arise. One unresolved
question is whether a leaseholder may assert a Lucas per se tak-
ings claim because the lease expires during a moratorium.12 This
scenario has been mentioned numerous times in the academic
literature," and most scholars at least assume that a Lucas
claim is possible.
The choice of whether to apply the Lucas per se rule or the
Penn Central balancing test when a lease expires during a mora-
torium has real consequences. Choosing the Lucas rule would
benefit leaseholders, who would need show only that their lease
lost all value to prevail on their takings claims. However, this
could make beneficial land-use regulations, such as building
moratoria, very costly, as the government would need to com-
pensate more leaseholders. Moreover, automatic compensation
could encourage government officials to end a moratorium as
quickly as possible in order to minimize the amount they would
have to pay. This could damage the effectiveness of the morato-
rium, which would not be in the public interest. By contrast, the
Penn Central test would allow courts to address the specific facts
of a takings claim and to take the nature of the temporary tak-
ing into account. However, this would make it more difficult for
leaseholders to receive just compensation.
The choice is also important to the future of the Lucas rule.
While Lucas was originally seen as a potentially significant shift
in regulatory-takings jurisprudence, the ruling in Tahoe-Sierra
tempered Lucas's significance and reinstalled the Penn Central
balancing test as the dominant approach. If leases subsumed by
moratoria are found to be amenable to the Lucas per se test, this
could spur renewed interest in per se regulatory-takings rules. If
the correct avenue is Penn Central, then the significance of Lu-
cas is even more limited; it would exist merely as a minor exception
10 See id at 330-32.
11 See Steven J. Eagle, Planning Moratoria and Regulatory Takings: The Supreme
Court's Fairness Mandate Benefits Landowners, 31 Fla St U L Rev 429, 444 (2004).
12 See id at 472-73.
13 See Part II.B.
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to the general regulatory-takings framework that favors the
Penn Central balancing test to per se rules.14
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an
overview of the relevant takings jurisprudence, addressing the
history of regulatory takings, the main regulatory-takings tests,
the parcel-as-a-whole rule, and the unique features of takings
jurisprudence that arise when the alleged taking is of a lease.
Part II surveys the current discourse on the taking of leases dur-
ing moratoria.
Part III argues that contrary to the current consensus, a
lease that expires during a moratorium is best analyzed under
the Penn Central balancing test. Two major arguments underlie
this choice. First, using the Penn Central analysis for leases is
most faithful to the opinion in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court's current
lodestar for analyzing regulatory takings. This Comment specif-
ically argues that, in light of the ruling in Tahoe-Sierra, the
unique temporal character of leaseholds favors the inclusion of
the period of use of the lease prior to the alleged taking as part
of the parcel as a whole, and advocates for a bright-line rule that
allows for a Lucas taking only if there is no prior use. Second,
options that are common in leases, such as rights to renew or
buy, cast into doubt whether a lease that is entirely subsumed
by a moratorium is truly without "all economically beneficial
use" as required under the Lucas per se rule. Taken together,
these arguments counsel in favor of adopting Penn Central as
the dominant test for leases expiring during a moratorium.
I. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF REGULATORY-TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE
This Part examines the relevant regulatory-takings doc-
trine. First, it sets forth a brief history of regulatory takings.
Second, it discusses the two main regulatory-takings approach-
es: the Lucas per se rule and the Penn Central balancing test.
Third, it looks in depth at an important piece of regulatory-
takings doctrine, the parcel-as-a-whole rule. Finally, it address-
es specific peculiarities that arise in takings jurisprudence when
the potential taking is of a leasehold.
14 See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice, 21 Const Commen 727, 753 (2004).
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A. The Foundation of Regulatory Takings
Takings jurisprudence arises from the Fifth Amendment,
which states in relevant part, "nor shall private property be tak-
en for public use, without just compensation."Is This clause, of-
ten referred to as the "Takings Clause,"16 is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.17 Until the early
twentieth century, it was generally believed that the Takings
Clause applied solely to physical appropriations or "the func-
tional equivalent of a practical ouster" of an owner's possession.18
Takings law radically shifted with Justice Holmes's decision
in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon.19 In this case, defendant
Pennsylvania Coal had mineral rights on the plaintiffs land.20
The Pennsylvania government subsequently banned the type of
mining necessary to enjoy the mineral rights, and the plaintiff
sued to enjoin the activities of the defendant.21 The Court invali-
dated the statute that banned the mining as an unconstitutional
taking of the defendant's property. In his majority opinion, Jus-
tice Holmes famously wrote, "The general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."22 This was the
first time the Court had explicitly endorsed the idea of a "regula-
tory taking."28
Problematically, Mahon offered little guidance for future
practitioners.24 On a broad level, the rule from Mahon is that a
15 US Const Amend V.
16 See, for example, Lucas, 505 US at 1014.
17 See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co v Chicago, 166 US 226, 241
(1897).
18 Lucas, 505 US at 1014 (quotation mark omitted). The phrase "practical ouster"
refers to situations like government-controlled flooding. See Transportation Co v Chica-
go, 99 US 635, 642 (1879) (distinguishing the case at hand from a "practical ouster" due
to permanent flooding mandated by the government). See also Harry N. Scheiber, Prop-
erty Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States,
1789-1910, 33 J Econ Hist 232, 236 (1973) (surveying the early history of takings law
and finding that it was confined to physical appropriations).
19 260 US 393 (1922).
20 Id at 412.
21 Id.
22 Id at 415.
23 See William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Signifi-
cance of Mahon, 86 Georgetown L J 813, 822-23 & n 55 (1998) (noting that a standard
conception of Mahon is that it was the first case to find a taking from government regu-
lation and listing other scholars who have made similar assertions).
24 See Lucas, 505 US at 1015 (noting that the opinion in Mahon offered "little in-
sight" into the standard for takings).
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regulation is a taking when it goes "too far," but a practical
method for determining when such a situation arises is absent
from the opinion.2 Much of the development and discussion of
takings law after Mahon, including the issue discussed in this
Comment, is an attempt to elucidate a workable framework for
determining what is "too far."26
B. The Regulatory-Takings Approaches
In the ninety years since Mahon was decided, the Supreme
Court has continually grappled with the contours of regulatory-
takings law. Two major approaches have arisen in this period
that are relevant to this Comment-the three-factor balancing
test in Penn Central and the per se rule in Lucas.27
1. The Penn Central balancing test.
The Penn Central balancing test is the most important test
in regulatory-takings jurisprudence.28 Aside from situations in
25 See id. See also Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 156
(Yale 1977) (describing Mahon as "both the most important and most mysterious writing
in takings law").
26 See Lucas, 505 US at 1015 (discussing the development of law after Mahon).
Even though regulatory takings have become an established and accepted area of tak-
ings law, there is some debate about whether regulatory takings are consistent with the
Framers' conception of takings law. See generally John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the
Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Nw U L Rev 1099
(2000); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 Colum L Rev 782 (1995).
27 The Court has attempted to create other regulatory-takings analyses. In Tahoe-
Sierra, the Court arguably created a third analytical framework, the "Armstrong princi-
ple," based on the considerations of "fairness and justice" as discussed by the Court in
Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40 (1960). See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 321, 333-39.
The actual status of this test is in dispute. Compare Eagle, 31 Fla St U L Rev at 430 (cit-
ed in note 11) (arguing that the opinion in Tahoe-Sierra announced an emphasis on fair-
ness with the Armstrong principle), with Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for
the Perplexed, 34 Ecol L Q 307, 345 (2007) (containing no mention of the Armstrong test
in a survey of takings law).
The Court arguably created another approach, known as the "substantially advanced
test," in Agins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a zoning regula-
tion "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state in-
terests"). Although this language was repeated in many post-Agins takings cases, see
Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc, 544 US 528, 540 (2005), the Court rejected this as a stand-
alone test because it is doctrinally unsound and practically unworkable. See id at 540-45.
28 See Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, and Guillermo A. Montero, "Oh Lord,
Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!" Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge and
Penn Central Frameworks, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 3 (2005) ("[T]he Penn Central formu-
lation ... has dominated discussion of takings law for a quarter of a century and contin-
ues to serve as the canonical standard for regulatory takings analysis.").
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which there is a complete and permanent deprivation of the value of
a parcel of land,29 Penn Central is the default regulatory-takings
test.30
The dispute in Penn Central arose after the city of New York
denied a landowner's plan to build a skyscraper on top of Grand
Central Terminal because it had been designated a "landmark
site" by the city.31 The owner of the terminal argued that the in-
ability to build on its property was a taking.32 The balancing-test
analysis arose from the majority's admission that the "Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for de-
termining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic inju-
ries caused by public action be compensated by the govern-
ment."3 The Court therefore ruled that a balancing test, based
on "ad hoc, factual inquiries" that looked "upon the particular
circumstances [in a] case," was the proper analysis.34
The Court in Penn Central put forth three factors that
should be addressed as part of the balancing test.35 These are (1)
the economic impact on the property owner, (2) the degree of in-
terference with the owner's distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions, and (3) the character of the government action.3< Because
these factors are not dispositive due to focus on the individual
circumstances of each case, the test is perhaps better character-
ized as an "analytical framework."37
Penn Central is routinely criticized in academia.38 Criticisms
include arguments that the Penn Central analysis is substan-
tively faulty, that the factors serve as bad predictors, and that
the factors themselves are poorly defined and lack consistency
29 This situation gives rise to the Lucas per se rule. See Part I.B.2.
30 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331 (ruling that Penn Central is the proper frame-
work if there is not a "total taking of the entire parcel").
31 Penn Central, 438 US at 107-19.
32 Id at 122.
33 Id at 124.
34 Id (quotation marks omitted).
35 For a thorough analysis of the Penn Central factors, see generally John D. Eche-
verria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 Envir L Rep 10471 (2009).
36 See Penn Central, 438 US at 124 (listing the factors that are normally used in
the Court's "ad hoc, factual inquiries"). The opinion does not explicitly break the factors
into three, but this is the common description of the Penn Central balancing test. See, for
example, Echeverria, 39 Envir L Rep at 10471 (cited in note 35) (listing the Penn Central
factors); Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 329 (cited in note 27) (same).
37 See Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 329-30 (cited in note 27) (describing why the phrase
"analytical framework" may be a better description than "test").
38 See Lawson, Ferguson, and Montero, 81 Notre Dame L Rev at 34-36 (cited in
note 28) (noting the vast array of criticism prompted by Penn Central).
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across opinions.39 One article, however, argued that a random
survey of cases citing Penn Central did not show evidence that
the test led to unfair results for litigants.40
2. The Lucas per se rule.
While the Court generally resists "[t]he temptation to adopt
what amount to per se rules in either direction,"41 the Court
ruled in Lucas that there is a per se taking "when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle."42 In Lucas, a developer of beach-
front property sued after a regulation barred him from erecting
any permanent structure on his property, effectively eliminating
all viable uses of his land.43 After this case, if a landowner can
show that a regulation has left his or her land without any "eco-
nomically viable" use, a taking has automatically occurred.44
It is unclear how strictly a court should interpret the re-
quirement that land be deprived of all economic uses.45 In his
dissent in Lucas, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the pe-
titioner's land was "far from valueless," and listed various uses
of the land that indicated it still had value.46 In the years since,
the Court has only partially answered this question. In Palazzo-
lo v Rhode Island,47 the Court concluded that leaving a "token
interest" is not enough for a government to avoid a per se taking
under Lucas.48 Leaving more than a token interest, however,
39 See id.
40 See F. Patrick Hubbard, et al, Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing un-
der the Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14
Duke Envir L & Pol F 121, 148-49 (2003) (analyzing whether the Penn Central balanc-
ing test routinely produces unfair or unjust results, and concluding that it does not).
41 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 321 (quotation marks omitted), quoting Palazzolo v
Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor concurring).
42 Lucas, 505 US at 1019. This is also referred to as a "total deprivation of benefi-
cial use." Id at 1017. There is an exception for nuisances, see id at 1022, but that is not
relevant for this Comment.
43 Id at 1008-09.
44 Id at 1016 (emphasis omitted) (describing times when the Court has always held
there to be a taking).
45 See Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 331-32 (cited in note 27).
46 Lucas, 505 US at 1065 n 3 (Stevens dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
47 533 US 606 (2001).
48 Id at 631. The Court in Palazzolo did not define "token interest" and simply not-
ed that a regulation permitting the landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-
acre parcel amounted to more than a token interest. See id. Professor Mark Cordes de-
scribed the "token interest" standard as "indicating that retention of some de minimus
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may foreclose a categorical taking. For example, a dramatic re-
duction in value is not enough to trigger Lucas.49 As the Court
wrote in Tahoe-Sierra, "Anything less than a 'complete elimina-
tion of value,' or a 'total loss,"' would not be a Lucas taking.5o
Tahoe-Sierra set the current relationship between Penn
Central and Lucas. Tahoe-Sierra resulted from a building mora-
torium that was put in place by an interstate land-use planning
agency so that the state governments of California and Nevada
could determine the environmental impact of construction on
Lake Tahoe.51 The moratorium lasted six years, and during the
period of the moratorium, properties on the lake were deprived
of all economically viable use.52 The Court wrote, "The starting
point for the court's analysis should have been to ask whether
there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn
Central was the proper framework."53
Tahoe-Sierra also clarified the situation in which a Lucas
taking could occur. Only a permanent deprivation of the value of
a property interest can lead to a categorical taking; a taking that
causes a complete, but temporary, deprivation of value is subject
to the Penn Central test because it is not permanent. 54 A Lucas
taking can occur only if a property interest is completely and
permanently deprived of all economic value. Anything else is
analyzed under Penn Central. The opinion in Tahoe-Sierra left
open the possibility that any property interest that was perma-
nently deprived of value could be a Lucas taking. That ambigui-
ty is the source of the topic in this Comment.
C. Conceptual Severance and the Parcel as a Whole
One of the most contentious issues in regulatory-takings
law5> is the question of how to define the property being taken.
[sic] value alone does not insulate a restriction from being a categorical taking." Mark W.
Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Environmental Land Use
Regulation, 43 Santa Clara L Rev 337, 361 (2003).
49 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 330 (holding that a 95 percent reduction in value is
not a Lucas taking).
50 Id.
51 Id at 306-12.
52 Id at 312-21.
53 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331.
54 See id at 330-32.
55 Takings law is extraordinarily complex. This Part discusses only a few concepts
in the regulatory-takings doctrine necessary to explore the issue in this Comment. For a




An example, using a simplified version of the facts in Mahon,
shows how this issue plays out. Assume that Blackacre is divid-
ed into two estates: the surface estate, worth $10,000, and the
mineral estate, worth $5,000. Thus Blackacre as a whole is
worth $15,000. The government passes a regulation, completely
wiping out the $5,000 value of the mineral estate. One view is
that the government regulation caused the value of Blackacre to
drop to $10,000, eliminating one-third of its value.56 Another
view is that the value of the mineral estate plummeted to zero,
and that estate is now valueless5 The latter view conceptually
severs a part of the property (the mineral estate) and then finds
that severed part completely valueless. This is known as "con-
ceptual severance."58
Described another way, both views agree on the numerator
(the amount of damage done to the property), but disagree on
the denominator (whether the damage should be compared
against the conceptually severed estate or the property as a
whole). How exactly this denominator should be chosen is not
clear, and numerous scholars have attempted to provide a co-
herent framework for the "denominator problem."59
Variations on conceptual severance and the denominator
problem have played a large role in the analysis of regulatory
takings. In Penn Central, the Court said that "[taking jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments" and
focused on the "nature and extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole."60 The Court's answer to the denominator
56 This is Justice Louis Brandeis's argument in his dissent in Mahon. See Mahon,
260 US at 416-22 (Brandeis dissenting).
57 This is Justice Holmes's argument in Mahon. See id at 412-16.
58 Professor Margaret Radin first coined the term "conceptual severance." See Mar-
garet Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurispru-
dence of Takings, 88 Colum L Rev 1667, 1676 (1988) (describing then-Justice William
Rehnquist's strategy in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County
of Los Angeles, California, 482 US 304 (1987), as "conceptual severance").
59 See generally, for example, Keith Woffinden, Comment, The Parcel as a Whole: A
Presumptive Structural Approach for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too
Far, 2008 BYU L Rev 623; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a
Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 En-
vir L 175 (2004); Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the Relevant Parcel, 25 U Hawaii L Rev
353 (2003); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 Rut-
gers L J 663 (1996); John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Taking Claims, 61 U Chi L Rev 1535 (1994). See also Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1192-93 (1967).
60 Penn Central, 438 US at 130-31 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
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problem was that the denominator is the entire parcel, called
the parcel as a whole. A little under a decade later, the Court re-
affirmed that the relevant unit of analysis is the entire parcel.61
The parcel-as-a-whole rule may sound like a clear answer to
the denominator problem, but in practice, it is not always clear
what the parcel as a whole should cover.62 For example, in Penn
Central, the Court ruled that the parcel as a whole was the en-
tire city tax block but gave no explanation of why it deemed the
block to be the whole parcel.63 Discomfort with the lack of preci-
sion in defining the parcel as a whole led the Court to retreat
from the rule. In Lucas, the Court mentioned in a footnote the
inconsistencies that could result from an overly strict applica-
tion of the parcel-as-a-whole rule and suggested that an alterna-
tive approach may occasionally make more sense. 64 This was
echoed by the majority opinion in Palazzolo, which commented
that "we have at times expressed discomfort with the logic of
[the parcel-as-a-whole rule]."65
The Court "ultimately strongly reaffirmed" the parcel-as-a-
whole rule in Tahoe-Sierra.66 The petitioners in that case argued
that the moratorium on building, which temporarily deprived
their land of all economic use, was a per se taking under the rule
in Lucas.67 The Court rejected this argument: "Petitioners' 'con-
ceptual severance' argument is unavailing because it ignores
Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we
must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.' We have consistently re-
jected such an approach to the 'denominator' question."68 After
61 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 497-98 (1987)
(finding that a mining company could not consider as a separate estate coal that could
not be mined after a regulation).
62 See Lisker, 27 Rutgers L J at 705 (cited in note 59) ("[T]he Court has not provid-
ed any type of formula for determining what constitutes the 'parcel as a whole."').
63 See Woffinden, Comment, 2008 BYU L Rev at 629 (cited in note 59) (questioning
the Court's choice of the city tax block as the "parcel as a whole").
64 See Lucas, 505 US at 1016-17 n 7 (noting the incongruities and confusion that
can arise from trying to define the full parcel). For an alternative view of the famous Lu-
cas footnote, see Wright, 34 Envir L at 192 & n 79 (cited in note 59) (postulating that
this footnote may have been motivated by Justice Antonin Scalia's concern that a taking
of 100 percent of the property would be automatically compensable, while a 99 percent
taking would not).
65 Palazzolo, 533 US at 631 (noting that there is criticism in judicial and academic
circles about the wisdom of having a strict parcel-as-a-whole rule).
66 Wright, 34 Envir L at 192 (cited in note 59).
67 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 307-20 (discussing the factual history of the case
and the petitioners' legal theory on appeal). See also Part I.B.2.
68 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331 (citations omitted).
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Tahoe-Sierra, a plaintiff cannot use conceptual severance to get
around the rule that the denominator should be the parcel as a
whole.69
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra further explained that, in deter-
mining what constitutes the parcel as a whole, an analysis of a
person's interest in property should address the "metes and
bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of
years that describes the temporal aspect of the owner's inter-
est."7o Despite this description, it is still not always clear what
constitutes the parcel as a whole.71 This confusion manifests it-
self in three contexts-physical/spatial severance, functional
severance, and temporal severance. 72 A thorough discussion of
temporal severance will be undertaken in Part III.
D. Takings Jurisprudence and Leases
Fees simple and leaseholds are two types of property inter-
ests. Fees simple are the basic ownership interest in land. They
are inheritable, alienable, devisable, and of infinite duration73
Leaseholds are the possessory interest in land or premises held
by a tenant.74 A tenant is a person who pays rent to temporarily
use and occupy another's land.76
Like fees simple, leaseholds are compensable under the Fifth
Amendment when the government takes land for public use.76
This is true for physical takings77 and for regulatory takings.78
69 For an analysis of the shifting views of the Supreme Court on the denominator
issue, see Wright, 34 Envir L at 190-92 (cited in note 59).
70 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331-32.
71 See Daniel L. Siegel, The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Temporary Regulatory Tak-
ings Law, 23 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 273, 285 n 88 (2005).
72 See, for example, Wright, 34 Envir L at 193-220 (cited in note 59) (giving an in-
depth description of four types of severance-physical (horizontal and vertical), function-
al, and temporal); Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 346-52 (cited in note 27) (giving an in-depth
analysis of three types of severance-spatial (encompassing horizontal, vertical, and
sold-off land), functional, and temporal).
73 See Richard R. Powell and Michael Allan Wolf, 1 Powell on Real Property § 13.03
at 13-12 (Bender 2012).
74 See Black's Law Dictionary 973 (West 9th ed 2009).
75 See id at 1506.
76 See Alamo Land & Cattle Co v Arizona, 424 US 295, 303-04 (1976) ("It has long
been established that the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled,
under the Fifth Amendment, to just compensation for the value of that interest when it
is taken upon condemnation by the United States.'). See also Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 319
(cited in note 27) ("Almost all interests in land are recognized as 'property' under the
Takings Clause.").
77 See, for example, United States v General Motors Corp, 323 US 373, 375, 380-84
(1945).
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Takings cases involving leases are generally treated the same as
takings involving fees simple, but some notable issues are worth
highlighting.
First, unlike a fee simple, a lease is not of infinite dura-
tion,79 which means that the timing of the regulation in relation
to the remaining duration of the lease is relevant. Two of the
most famous leasehold cases, United States v General Motors
CorpSo and United States v Petty Motor Co,81 illustrate this dis-
tinction. In Petty Motor, the leasehold expired during the physi-
cal occupation of the land,82 while in General Motors, the plain-
tiff still had a leasehold interest in the property after the
government relinquished the lease.83 The plaintiff in Petty Motor
received the "value of the interest taken," which in that case was
the market value of the leasehold8 By contrast, in General Mo-
tors, the plaintiff received extra compensation (beyond the mar-
ket value) because, once the government left, the plaintiff had to
either return to its leasehold interest or bear the responsibility
for the leasehold85 This "continuing obligation" was a greater
burden than just losing the lease, so the Government owed extra
compensation.86 Describing the difference in these two cases, the
Court in Petty Motor wrote, "There is a fundamental difference
between the taking of a part of a lease and the taking of the
whole lease."87 This shows that the duration of a lease and the
timing of a regulation, and the consequences that arise from
their interaction, are important parts of the takings analysis.
The second relevant issue is the relationship between the
lessor and the lessee. In many leasing cases, the contract does
not indemnify the lessee, nor is the lease voided in the event of a
taking, so courts treat the lessee as the only aggrieved party.
Indemnification and voiding clauses do exist, and it is important
78 See, for example, Resource Investments, Inc v United States, 85 Fed Cl 447, 478-
79 (2009).
79 See notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
80 323 US 373 (1945).
81 327 US 372 (1946).
82 See id at 375.
83 See General Motors, 323 US at 375.
84 See Petty Motor, 327 US at 377-78.
85 See General Motors, 323 US at 382-84. See also Petty Motor, 327 US at 379 (de-
scribing why the plaintiff in General Motors was owed more compensation than the
plaintiff in Petty Motor).
86 See Petty Motor, 327 US at 379-80.
87 Id at 379.
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to recognize that courts do not allow double recovery.88 The les-
sor and lessee cannot recover for the same taking. When an al-
leged taking occurs, a lessee's only recourse is frequently a lawsuit
against the government for a taking without just compensation.89
As discussed above, the normal takings rules do not always
apply to leasehold-takings claims. Part II outlines and analyzes
the current judicial and academic debate on one area of poten-
tial divergence-the analytical framework when a lease is sub-
sumed by a temporary moratorium.
II. CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE LEASE-SUBSUMING MORATORIUM
ISSUE
Judges and scholars have recognized that leasehold takings
claims can diverge from the general doctrine when a lease ends
in a moratorium. Justice Anthony Kennedy directly raised this
issue during oral argument in Tahoe-Sierra. After the Court de-
livered the opinion in that case, various scholars noted that the
lease issue remains an open question. This Part addresses these
two periods of inquiry in turn.
A. The Tahoe-Sierra Oral Argument
Even before Tahoe-Sierra was decided, it was apparent that
a decision on the scope of the ruling in Lucas would have reper-
cussions outside of Tahoe-Sierra's specific fact pattern. During
the oral argument in Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Kennedy specifically
asked John Roberts, then the advocate for the Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,9o what test the Court should apply if the mor-
atorium had instead wiped out an entire leasehold.
Justice Kennedy described a hypothetical landowner affect-
ed by the moratorium, who leased his property to someone plan-
ning to put a mobile home on the land for one year. In this hypo-
thetical scenario, the moratorium encompassed that lease, thus
88 See id at 375-76 (barring a lessee from recovering because the lease had a provi-
sion that it was void in the event of a taking); Alamo Land & Cattle, 424 US at 303-04
(barring a lessor from recovering for a taking if the lessee was allowed to recover).
89 This is important because during the oral argument in Tahoe-Sierra, there was
discussion about whether the lessor or lessee would bear the burden if a lease was per-
manently subsumed by a moratorium. See Part II.A.
90 While Chief Justice Roberts has heard regulatory-takings cases during his time
on the bench, see, for example, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v United States,
133 S Ct 511, 522 (2012), he has not yet had to address the nature of the relationship
between Lucas and Penn Central since the oral argument in Tahoe-Sierra.
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denying the leaseholder the ability to use the property.9' Justice
Kennedy questioned Roberts about why his hypothetical was dif-
ferent than previous leasehold takings cases and not an auto-
matic taking, as was the result in cases like General Motors.92
Justice Kennedy also addressed the relationship between the
lessee and the lessor. He assumed that after the regulation de-
prived the land of beneficial use, the lessee's claim would be
against the lessor for the inability to use and enjoy the lease.93
The lessor, in turn, would sue the government for effecting a
taking without just compensation.94
Roberts believed that the proper analytical framework was
Penn Central.95 Roberts argued that in past takings cases in
which the Court faced "a regulation that applie[d] to a discrete
property interest," it did not then "redefine the effective property
interest" as the "discrete property interest" affected by the regu-
lation.96 Those cases were also distinguishable because they
were either about "a physical appropriation or, extended to Lu-
cas, a ban on total economic use," while the case here involved a
temporary regulation.9* Roberts noted that in the case at hand,
the properties were held by the petitioners as fees simple.98 In
response to Justice Kennedy's questions about lessees and les-
sors, Roberts said that "presumably the impact of regulation
would be something that would be addressed in the lease
agreement itself," and that the question of "who bears the re-
sponsibility ... [is] between the lessor and the lessee."99
As Tahoe-Sierra changed much of the regulatory-takings
landscape,100 the analyses and arguments proffered by Justice
Kennedy and Roberts are no longer totally up to date. Still, a
few points are worth highlighting. First, Roberts anticipated
91 Transcript of Oral Argument, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, No 00-1167, *26-27 (US Jan 7, 2002) (available on Westlaw
at 2002 WL 43288) ("Tahoe-Sierra Argument").
92 Id at *26-29.
93 Id at *30.
94 Id.
95 See Tahoe-Sierra Argument at *26-31 (cited in note 91).
96 Id at *29 (noting the Court's approach in Penn Central, Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470 (1987), and Concrete Pipe & Products of Califor-
nia, Inc v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 US 602
(1993)).
97 Tahoe-Sierra Argument at *27-28 (cited in note 91).
98 Id at *29.
99 Id at *30.
100 See Parts I.B and I.C.
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many of the arguments for why a leasehold should be treated
differently, including that the physical-leasehold-takings cases
are distinguishable, that the property interest would still retain
value due to the temporary nature of the regulation, and that
the Lucas case was designed for "rare circumstances."101 Roberts
was adamant that Penn Central was the proper test in this situation.102
Second, while Roberts and Justice Kennedy both discussed
the lessor/lessee relationship,103 their analyses were incomplete.
Both Justice Kennedy and Roberts seemed satisfied with view-
ing the relationship as purely contractual, thereby concluding
that a regulatory taking by the government would allow the les-
see to recover from the lessor rather than from the government.
The lessor would then try to recover from the government.04
However, this presupposes the existence of an indemnification
or voiding clause, which is not necessarily present in a lease.105
By not addressing the scenario in which the leaseholder could
only sue the government for a taking, the oral argument failed
to provide an in-depth analysis of the heart of Justice Kennedy's
hypothetical-that is, the argument did not address what ana-
lytical framework should be used if a leasehold loses all benefi-
cial value during the moratorium.
B. Commentary after Tahoe-Sierra
Since the decision in Tahoe-Sierra, many scholars have rec-
ognized that the opinion leaves open the possibility that a lease-
hold completely subsumed by a moratorium could qualify as a
per se taking under Lucas.106 While none of these scholars ex-
plored the issue in any depth, almost all of them assumed that a
leasehold that terminates before the end of a moratorium-and
101 See Tahoe-Sierra Argument at *26-31 (cited in note 91).
102 See id at *29 ("1 am sure that it's still evaluated under Penn Central.").
103 See id at *26-31.
104 See id at *30.
105 See notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
106 See David W. Spohr, Cleaning Up the Rest of Agins: Bringing Coherence to Tem-
porary Takings Jurisprudence and Jettisoning "Extraordinary Delay", 41 Envir L Rep
10435, 10443 n 124 (2011); Daniel L. Siegel and Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Set-
tled Principles and Unresolved Questions, 11 Vt J Envir L 479, 483-84 (2010); Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich L Rev 1835,
1862 n 98 (2006); Eagle, 31 Fla St U L Rev at 472-73 (cited in note 11); Wright, 34 Envir
L at 216-17 (cited in note 59); Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 Envir L
1, 15-16 (2003); J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 Ford-
ham L Rev 1, 32-33 (2002).
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is therefore rendered valueless--could potentially implicate the
Lucas per se rule.o7 Two major reasons underlie this specula-
tion. First, if leases are treated like fees simple, then a morato-
rium that fully engulfed a lease would deprive the property in-
terest of all beneficial use, triggering the Lucas rule.108 Second,
the language in Tahoe-Sierra seems to limit the opinion to ad-
dressing fees simple,109 so a Lucas claim is still potentially avail-
able for a lease.110
No commentator specifically says that this would be a Lucas
taking, but all recognize that Tahoe-Sierra does not foreclose the
possibility. In the next Part this Comment argues that, contrary
to the academic trend, the initial presumption by Roberts of
Penn Central's superiority was correct.
III. PENN CENTRAL IS THE PROPER ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This Comment argues that the Penn Central balancing test
is the proper approach to analyze whether a taking occurs when
a lease expires during a moratorium. This approach best aligns
with the current takings doctrine and takes into account op-
tions, present in many leases, that add value to the lease beyond
just the enjoyment of the lease.
The choice of approach is a question of which party should
bear the burden, not a normative question of whether a regula-
tion is a taking. Theoretically, a regulation that goes "too far"
should be found to be a taking regardless of whether a court us-
es the Lucas rule or the Penn Central balancing test."' The rea-
son that the choice matters arises from the tension between the
rights of property owners and the ability of the government to
107 See note 106.
108 See note 106.
109 Examples of this language include: "An interest in real property is defined by the
metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that
describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest," Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331-32
(emphasis added), and "[1]ogically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon
as the prohibition is lifted." Id at 332 (emphasis added).
110 See note 106. Professor Richard Lazarus found the specific choice of language to
be especially noteworthy. See Lazarus, 33 Envir L at 15-16 (cited in note 106).
111 See Echeverria, 39 Envir L Rep at 10474 (cited in note 35) (arguing that it is
"possible to interpret the Lucas test as an application of the Penn Central analysis,"
where "the economic impact is so substantial that this factor establishes a taking with-
out regard to the other factors").
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implement regulations for the public good.112 The Lucas per se
rule favors landowners because it is cheaper than the more ex-
haustive Penn Central analysis,113 and it is dispositive if the
property owner can show that all beneficial use is permanently
eliminated.114 Conversely, the Penn Central balancing test favors
the public interest because it allows an "inquiry into all of the
relevant circumstances in particular cases" and does not auto-
matically constrain potentially useful government actions like
building moratoria."is
This tension between Lucas and Penn Central is at the
heart of the difficulty in determining the proper approach to
leases expiring during moratoria. From the perspective of pro-
tecting property rights, this scenario implicates the same con-
cern that animated the ruling in Lucas-that the complete elim-
ination of value implies that the regulation is unfairly
burdensome."16 However, the public interest also needs to be
taken into account. The Lucas rule is reserved for "extraordinary
circumstance[s],"117 and unless such circumstances are present,
the Penn Central balancing test best protects the government's
ability to act in the public interest while still compensating
property owners who have suffered a taking."18
This Part contains two distinct arguments that point to
Penn Central as the proper analytical framework. First, the
Penn Central test is most compatible with Tahoe-Sierra, the
Court's most recent analysis of the relationship between the two
regulatory-takings approaches, and with subsequent cases. This
112 See Underkuffler, 21 Const Commen at 747-52 (cited in note 14) (discussing how
property rights and regulations in the public interest are an important part of the Su-
preme Court's analysis of justice in regulatory takings).
113 See Tahoe-Sierra Argument at *26, 47-48 (cited in note 91).
114 See Part I.B.2. When a plaintiff alleges a Lucas taking, the court first analyzes
whether there is a complete and permanent deprivation of value. If there is not a com-
plete deprivation, then the court next applies the Penn Central balancing test to see
whether there is a taking. See Part I.B.
115 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 334. The Court also noted that "[t]he interest in fa-
cilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies counsels against adopting a
per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their deliberations." Id at 339.
116 See Lucas, 505 US at 1017-18:
[I]n the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically bene-
ficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge our usual assump-
tion that the legislature is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life" . . . in a manner that secures an "average reciprocity of advantage"
to everyone concerned.
117 Id at 1017. See also note 122 and accompanying text.
118 See Part I.B.
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Comment specifically argues that, consistent with the opinion in
Tahoe-Sierra, the use of a lease prior to a regulation should be
considered as part of the parcel as a whole, and advocates for a
bright-line rule that a leasehold subsumed by a moratorium only
qualifies for the Lucas per se rule if there is no prior use. Sec-
ond, options like the right to renew or option to purchase, pre-
sent in many leases, make it debatable that a lease could be con-
sidered completely valueless, which would render the Lucas test
inapplicable. This Part concludes by acknowledging that, in rare
cases, a lease expiring during a moratorium could implicate a
per se taking under Lucas.
A. Employing the Penn Central Analysis Is the Best Doctrinal
Fit with Tahoe-Sierra
The opinion in Tahoe-Sierra was a pivotal moment in tak-
ings jurisprudence"19 and is the Court's most recent major deci-
sion discussing the relationship between Lucas and Penn Cen-
tral. Applying the Penn Central test when a lease is subsumed
by a moratorium incorporates two of the important doctrinal el-
ements of Tahoe-Sierra-the diminished role of the Lucas test
and the reaffirmation of the parcel-as-a-whole rule.120
1. The Supreme Court favors Penn Central.
The diminution of the role of the Lucas test can be explained
in two related ways. First, Tahoe-Sierra made clear that the
primary approach in regulatory-takings cases is the Penn Cen-
tral approach.121 Second, courts should be hesitant to liberally
extend the Lucas rule, since the Court has suggested that Lucas
should be applied only in rare circumstances.
119 See Underkuffler, 21 Const Commen at 728 (cited in note 14); Lazarus, 33 Envir
L at 3 (cited in note 106).
120 See Lazarus, 33 Envir L at 10-12 (cited in note 106). Professor Lazarus included
these two in a section on "Highlights" of the case. Id at 7. The other two highlights were
the "Severance of Physical from Regulatory Takings," see id at 9-10, which is relevant to
the extent that physical-takings jurisprudence is not controlling on any regulatory-
takings issues in this Comment, and "Potentially Favorable Future Applications of the
Penn Central Test," which discussed dicta in Tahoe-Sierra favoring land-use regulations.
See id at 13-14.
121 See Part I.B. See also Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v United States, 133
S Ct 511, 518 (2012) ("[M]ost takings claims turn on situation-specific factual inquir-
ies."); Underkuffler, 21 Const Commen at 736 (cited in note 14) ("If there had been any
prior doubt about the seriousness of the Court's embrace of Penn Central's ad hoc, bal-
ancing, broad-gauged approach in takings cases, there is no doubt now.").
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It is worth describing the second explanation in more depth.
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court wrote that the Lucas rule was re-
served for "extraordinary circumstance[s]."122 This means that
"[iln ... almost all cases, 'the concepts of "fairness and justice"
that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served ... by a
Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances."'123
The implications of Lucas's diminishment are subtle, but
important. Lucas is still good law,124 and at first glance it may
seem like a lease subsumed by a moratorium should be analyzed
no differently than a lease that loses all value due to a perma-
nent regulation.125 However, two considerations call this as-
sumption into question.
First, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra limited the precedential
scope of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v County of Los Angeles, California,126 which had been viewed as
supporting the application of the Lucas rule to both permanent
and temporary regulations.127 In First English, the Court ruled
that even if a regulation found to be a taking was only tempo-
rary, just compensation was still owed under the Fifth Amend-
ment.128 The Court in Tahoe-Sierra concluded that First English
established only that temporary regulatory takings were com-
pensable and that it made no ruling on the antecedent question
122 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 324 n 19, 330, 332, 337.
123 Underkuffler, 21 Const Commen at 736 (cited in note 14), quoting Tahoe-Sierra,
535 US at 334.
124 See Lazarus, 33 Envir L at 8 (cited in note 106).
125 Recall that the Lucas analysis has been applied to leases under permanent regu-
lations. See Resource Investments, Inc v United States, 85 Fed Cl 447, 481 (2009) (hold-
ing that a "prospectively permanent" regulation burdening a leasehold was a categorical
taking) (emphasis omitted); Vulcan Materials Co v City of Tehuacana, 369 F3d 882, 888-
92 (5th Cir 2004) (holding that an ordinance making a mining lease valueless was a cat-
egorical taking under the Texas Constitution, using a Texas case that extensively cited
Lucas as support).
126 482 US 304 (1987).
127 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 347-48 (Rehnquist dissenting) ("Our opinion in
[First English] ... rejects any distinction between temporary and permanent takings
when a landowner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of his land.").
128 See First English, 482 US at 318-19:
These cases reflect the fact that "temporary" takings which, as here, deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation. . . . Where
[a burden on property] results from governmental action that amounted to a
taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that
the government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during
this period.
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of whether a taking had occurred.129 Tahoe-Sierra thus nullified
the major precedent for linking the takings rules for temporary
and permanent regulations.130
Second, physical-takings jurisprudence treats temporary
and permanent uses of property differently. Permanent physical
occupations are per se takings, whereas temporary physical in-
vasions are analyzed under Penn Central.1ax Tahoe-Sierra's de-
coupling of permanent and temporary regulatory takingsas2 thus
brings regulatory-takings jurisprudence in line with other areas
of takings law.
In sum, it is not a given that a court would automatically
apply Lucas. The question thus becomes whether a lease sub-
sumed by a moratorium is one of those "extraordinary" cases in
which Lucas should be extended.
2. The parcel as a whole and temporal severance.
Tahoe-Sierra reaffirmed the parcel-as-a-whole rule as a cen-
tral focus of all takings claims.'> How a court defines the rele-
vant parcel affects the choice between the Lucas and Penn Cen-
tral frameworks, because the Lucas rule is only available if the
entire parcel is completely devalued.34 As leasehold interests,
unlike fees simple, are not of infinite duration135 the relevant
parcel analysis for a leasehold subsumed by a moratorium
should deviate from the general rules for the parcel as a whole
based on this unique temporal character. This Comment argues
that because leaseholds are different, the relevant parcel should in-
clude both the period after the regulation and the period prior to the
regulation.136 Utimately, this Comment proposes a bright-line rule
129 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 328-30 ("[I]t is important to recognize that we did
not address in [First English] the quite different and logically prior question whether the
temporary regulation at issue had in fact constituted a taking.").
130 See Breemer, 71 Fordham L Rev at 19 (cited in note 106) ("Perhaps the most re-
markable statement [in the Tahoe-Sierra opinion] is that First English does not estab-
lish the constitutional equivalency of temporary and permanent regulations.").
131 See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 428-35 (1982)
(holding that there is a "constitutional distinction between a permanent occupation and
a temporary physical invasion'). See also Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 360-63 (cited in note 27).
132 See note 120.
133 See note 120 and accompanying text. See also Part I.C.
134 See Part I.B.2.
13 See Part I.D.
136 Recall that the Lucas rule for fees simple examines economically beneficial use
only prospectively, not retrospectively. See Part I.B.2. As applied to fees simple, Lucas
defines the relevant parcel of land only prospectively. This is clear from the facts of the
case-the Court found that South Carolina's land use statute deprived the relevant
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that unless there is no prior enjoyment of the lease, Penn Cen-
tral is the proper analytical framework when a lease is sub-
sumed by a moratorium.
The current doctrinal relationship of the parcel as a whole
to the temporal aspects of property comes from Tahoe-Sierra.
There, the Court emphasized that temporal periods cannot be
conceptually severed and that all temporal periods of an interest
in property must be included in the denominator137 In Tahoe-
Sierra, the petitioners' land was valueless for the duration of the
moratorium but regained value once the moratorium was lifted.
The Court ruled that the period during the moratorium could
not be temporally severed from the entire temporal life of the
property interest because the parcel as a whole includes a tem-
poral dimension as well as a physical dimension.138 The Court
held that because the property was not made completely value-
less by the moratorium, a Lucas claim was inapplicable.as A
landowner could not artificially manufacture a Lucas per se tak-
ing by selecting only a certain temporal period of his or her
property interest.
Before addressing how the rules for the parcel as a whole and
temporal severance apply to a lease subsumed by a moratorium,
parcel of "all economically beneficial use" even though the fee simple estate existed be-
fore the statute's enactment. Lucas, 505 US at 1019-20. For a discussion of Lucas, see
Part I.B.2.
137 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 330-31 (rejecting petitioner's suggestion that the
relevant parcel was the thirty-two-month temporal segment of the estate coinciding with
the construction moratorium). Issues of severance generally arise when a party tries to
separate its property interest into artificial parts, like smaller tracts of land or temporal
periods. See Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 346-53 (cited in note 27). For example, a court looking
at the extent of damage done to a leasehold by a taking would include only the temporal
period of the lease and would not consider a temporal period that existed before the
leasehold as relevant. Some courts, however, will include property outside of the specific
property interest in the parcel as a whole if the court believes that the nonartificial split
(for example, a sale of land) was done to maximize a taking. See id at 349-50.
138 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 331-32 ("An interest in real property is defined by
the metes and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that
describes the temporal aspect of the owner's interest.").
139 See id at 332 ("Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon
as the prohibition is lifted."). Put another way, the land would continue to have value
during the moratorium because the possibility of use after the moratorium would give
the land value to potential buyers or investors. See Eagle, 31 Fla St U L Rev at 446 (cit-
ed in note 11) ("The parcel has value not under the use restriction but rather in con-
templation of the removal of the use restriction."). In Lucas, by contrast, a regulation left
the land permanently without value-at no point after the regulation would the land be
worth anything. See Lucas, 505 US at 1009.
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it is worth examining a few examples involving fees simple to
see how the doctrine normally functions.
Imagine that Julia buys Whiteacre in fee simple. Julia uses
the property for five years before a permanent regulation re-
moves all beneficial value from Whiteacre. This is a per se tak-
ing under Lucas.140 Next, imagine that the permanent regulation
was promulgated immediately after Julia bought Whiteacre, and
the land was deprived of all beneficial value. As above, this is a
Lucas taking. Nor does adding years alter the outcome. If Julia
owned Whiteacre for twenty years prior to the permanent regu-
lation, there would still be a Lucas taking if the land was per-
manently deprived of all beneficial value after the regulation.
Finally, imagine instead that five years after buying
Whiteacre, a two-year temporary building moratorium was im-
posed on Whiteacre, and for those two years no beneficial value
existed. This would not qualify as a per se taking under Lucas
because Whiteacre would regain its value after the moratorium
ended. Further, Julia could not temporally sever the two years
to create a Lucas per se taking.141
These examples highlight an important aspect of the Lucas
per se rule for fees simple-it is solely a prospective test. When
analyzing a Lucas claim, a court measures the prospective value
of the land after an alleged taking to determine whether there is
any remaining beneficial value. The period prior to the alleged
taking is unimportant. This makes sense when considering the
above examples, because regardless of how long Julia held
Whiteacre prior to the regulation, the regulation deprived her in
all instances of the same thing, which is the ability to beneficial-
ly use Whiteacre in fee simple.142
When determining the relevant parcel for a lease subsumed
by a moratorium, the temporal period prior to the taking should
not be similarly ignored. Leases are not permanent, so the only
relevant temporal period is the duration of the lease.148 As dis-
cussed in Part I.D, this means that the impact of a regulation on
a leasehold interest depends on the remaining duration of the
140 See Part I.B.2.
141 See notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
142 This does not mean that the prior use has no effect on property value. For exam-
ple, a fee simple may have its primary value in something like minerals, and if the min-
erals are used up, the land would be less valuable. The Lucas test for fees simple, how-
ever, takes into account only whether the regulation permanently took away all future
economically beneficial uses of the fee simple. See Part I.B.2.
143 See Part I.D.
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lease. Because leaseholds are different from fees simple, this
Comment argues that the period prior to the regulation should
be considered as part of the denominator when determining the
relevant parcel.
Consider two leases held by Julia, Lease A and Lease B.
Lease A is a five-year lease, signed on January 1st and having
an effective start date of February 1st. On January 15th, a regu-
lation is passed that enacts a six-year building moratorium, de-
priving Lease A of all beneficial value for the full five-year peri-
od.1 Lease B is also a five-year lease. Four years into Julia's use
of Lease B, a six-year building moratorium is enacted, depriving
Julia of the full value of the lease for the remaining year.
In both scenarios, a temporary regulation eliminated all re-
maining value of the lease. But should both scenarios be ana-
lyzed similarly? In the case of Lease A, the regulation came into
effect before Julia could enjoy the lease. This seems to implicate
the concerns about unfair burden that underlie the rationale for
the Lucas rule for fees simple.145 Lease B is different. In Lease B,
only one year of the five years of the lease is deprived of value.
Unlike fees simple, in which the prior use did not alter the prop-
erty interest that was ultimately deprived of beneficial value,
prior use does matter with leases. This counsels in favor of in-
cluding the temporal period prior to the regulation as part of the
relevant parcel, which also means that the Lucas rule would on-
ly be applicable if all beneficial value was completely eliminated
from the entirety of the lease.146
Case law in the Federal Circuit, which hears many cases in
which the federal government is being sued for monetary re-
lief,147 implicitly supports this argument. In Rith Energy, Inc v
144 This does not include the potential value of options, which are discussed in Part
III.B.
145 See note 116.
146 Another way to think about this is in accounting terms. Land, unlike most as-
sets, does not depreciate in value over time. See Gary A. Porter and Curtis L. Norton,
Financial Accounting: The Impact on Decision Makers 398 (South-Western 8th ed 2013)
("All property, plant, and equipment, except land, have a limited life and decline in use-
fulness over time."). This means that, in the abstract, the value of a fee simple is not af-
fected by prior use of the property. By contrast, a lease's value correlates with the time it
has been in effect. For example, if a lessee were trying to sublease her land, a sublessee
would pay more for a six-year lease that had five years remaining than for a six-year
lease that had four years remaining. When looking at the value of a lease, meaningful
analysis can be gleaned from analyzing the period prior to the taking.
147 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over
appeals from the United States Court of Federal Claims. 28 USC § 1295(a)(3). The Court
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims for monetary relief that arise from alleged
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United States,148 a coal company leased mineral rights from a
private party and obtained the required mining permit from the
government.149 The mining permit was subsequently suspended
because of safety concerns. 50 Although the coal company was in-
itially allowed to do some mining during the suspension,"'1 the
government ultimately permanently suspended all mining. This
meant that the coal company was no longer able to exercise its
mineral rights.152 The coal company argued that the mining sus-
pension was a per se taking under Lucas.1" The Federal Circuit
responded that because the regulation, a mining permit, allowed
the coal company to mine for a period of time before ultimately
prohibiting the activity, it was "appropriate to look at the extent
to which [the coal company] was able to exploit its leases
throughout the permitting period.""5 Because the regulation did
not eliminate all beneficial value of land (it spared the value ex-
tracted before the regulation), Penn Central was the appropriate
test.15 5
Later Federal Circuit cases have affirmed the ruling in Rith
Energy. In Maritrans Inc v United States,156 certain types of
boats were deemed unsafe by the government.15 7 The govern-
ment passed a law setting retirement dates for those boats, after
which they could no longer be used.158 The Federal Circuit ruled
that this was not a Lucas taking because the law allowed the
boat owner to get some value from the boats prior to the date of
retirement."so The court cited Rith Energy as the basis for its
conclusionl6o and linked the Rith Energy rationale to the recent
violations by the federal government of "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."
28 USC § 1491(a)(1). Recall that takings claims are government violations of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments. See Part I.A.
148 247 F3d 1355 (Fed Cir 2001).
149 Id at 1358.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Rith Energy, 247 F3d at 1358.
153 Id 1361-62 (explaining that the coal company argued that the government regu-
lation constituted a taking because it "deprived [the company] of all economic value in
the coal leases").
154 Id at 1362.
15 See id at 1363.
156 342 F3d 1344 (Fed Cir 2003).
157 Id at 1348.
18 Id at 1348-49.
159 Id at 1353-55.
160 Maritrans, 342 F3d at 1353-55.
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ruling in Tahoe-Sierra.161 The Federal Circuit instead held that
the Penn Central analysis was the proper approach to determine
whether a taking occurred.162
The reasoning behind the rule in Rith Energy arises in large
part from the idea that the government permitted some use of
the property interest before permanently denying any future
use. This is similar to the zoning idea that an amortization peri-
od mitigates a taking.163 The regulation could not be said to have
denied all economically beneficial use because the regulation
guaranteed that some use, albeit limited, would be available.
Notice, however, that the Federal Circuit in Rith Energy
analyzed the amount of coal extracted prior to the suspension
along with the amount of coal extracted during the suspen-
sion.164 The examination of the coal extracted during the suspen-
sion follows from the amortization-like logic discussed above.
But this does not explain why the Federal Circuit also looked at
the amount of coal extracted prior to the suspension, and the court
did not explicitly elucidate why it applied Lucas retrospectively.165
This aspect of the opinion in Rith Energy can be explained
by recognizing that the Federal Circuit implicitly included prior
use as part of the parcel as a whole. A factor that seems to be
driving the Federal Circuit's analysis is that a significant por-
tion of the coal company's property interest was extracted prior
161 Id at 1355 n 6.
162 See id at 1355-56 ("When a court determines that a categorical taking has not
occurred, it must embark on a fact-based inquiry in which it applies the standard prom-
ulgated by the Supreme Court in Penn Central to evaluate whether the governmental
action at issue nevertheless resulted in a regulatory taking.").
163 See Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 351 (cited in note 27). An amortization period is a "pe-
riod of time granted to the owners of nonconforming uses during which they may phase
out their operations as they see fit and make other arrangements, that is, a grace period
putting the owners on fair notice of the law and giving them a fair opportunity to recoup
their investments." 12 NY Jur 2d Buildings § 350. For an example of an amortization
case, see 801 Conklin Street Ltd v Town of Babylon, 38 F Supp 2d 228, 249 (EDNY 1999)
('The Code's amortization provision ... envelops and eliminates Plaintiffs adverse con-
demnation 'takings' claim.").
164 See Rith Energy, 247 F3d at 1360. Recall that in Rith Energy two distinct gov-
ernmental actions occurred. First, the government issued a mining permit to the coal
company. Second, after determining that the mining was not safe, the government al-
lowed some mining before permanently suspending the permit and ending all activity. Id
at 1359-61. See also text accompanying notes 149-55.
165 The court in Rith Energy determined that these actions were all part of the same
"regulatory program." See Rith Energy, 247 F3d at 1363. If that argument were to be
taken seriously, it would lead to an absurd result, because the government would be able
to get around all Lucas claims by issuing a permit for any activity they might later de-
cide to deprive of all benefit.
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to the permanent suspension. The court wrote that the amount
of coal extracted, "although only about 14 percent of the amount
Rith hoped to exiract under its permit, cannot be regarded as
merely a 'nominal' recovery . . . reflecting the 'total wipe-out'
that accompanies a categorical taking."166 This analysis was only
possible because the lease encompassed a finite amount of coal.
Had the coal company owned the land in fee simple, and had
there been an unlimited supply of coal, the court would not have
been able to make the same argument, because the prior actions
of the coal company would have had no effect on the value or use
of the land going forward. Discomfort with the idea that this
could be a categorical taking when the coal company had already
received a fair amount of the total possible value from the prop-
erty interest caused the Federal Circuit to include the prior use
in its calculations. This supports this Comment's argument
that use prior to the taking of a lease is a relevant part of the
denominator.
If the use prior to a regulation should be part of the relevant
parcel for a lease subsumed by a moratorium, an essential sec-
ond question is the effect that the inclusion of prior use should
have on the choice between Lucas or Penn Central as the proper
analytical framework. This Comment offers a bright-line rule-if
no use or enjoyment of the lease exists prior to the temporary
regulation, then the proper analysis is Lucas, but if there is any
existing prior use, the correct framework is Penn Central. Recall
the leasehold examples discussed previously. Lease A, which
was deprived of all value before the start date of the lease,
would be analyzed under Lucas. Lease B, which was deprived of
all value after Julia enjoyed the lease for four years, would be
analyzed under Penn Central.
The aim of this bright-line rule is to create a simple, worka-
ble standard that can be easily applied. There is a lot of doctri-
nal arbitrariness in determining when a regulation has gone
"too far."167 This rule seeks to combat this unpredictability by
clearly delineating the circumstances necessary to move from
the Lucas rule to the Penn Central rule. Any period of prior use
of a lease means that the proper analytical framework is Penn
Central. This operationalizes what was implicitly recognized in
166 Id.
167 See, for example, Part I.B.2 (noting that the Lucas rule applies for only a 100
percent taking, but does not apply for a 95 percent taking); Part I.C (discussing the chal-
lenge in determining what makes up the parcel as a whole).
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cases like Rith Energy-that prior use of a lease should (a) be
part of the parcel as a whole and (b) foreclose the Lucas test as
the proper analytic framework.
This bright-line rule for leases subsumed by a moratorium
furthers the objectives of Tahoe-Sierra and subsequent deci-
sions. First, the rule would mean that the parcel as a whole in-
cludes all temporal periods. While Tahoe-Sierra dealt only with
temporal periods after a regulation, the analysis of the use prior
to a regulation is a worthy addition to the parcel-as-a-whole rule
for leaseholds. As discussed above, the period prior to the al-
leged taking of a leasehold offers valuable information about the
effect a moratorium had on a specific lease. Second, a rule that
stipulates that Lucas applies only if no prior use exists advances
the principle in Tahoe-Sierra that Lucas cases be reserved for
"extraordinary circumstances."168 Barring the rare situations in
which there is no prior use, the balancing test in Penn Central thus
offers the best framework of analysis for the parcel as a whole after
Tahoe-Sierra when the property interest is a leasehold.
B. Leaseholds and the Deprivation of All Economically
Beneficial Use
If a lease is found to have no prior use, a second question
emerges-whether a leasehold that is completely subsumed by a
moratorium would satisfy the Lucas test. In order for a regula-
tion to qualify as a Lucas taking, the lease would need to be
completely and permanently deprived of all economic value.169
How should courts determine whether that has happened?
Depriving a property interest of all economically viable use
entails two things. First, the regulation needs to wipe out the
entire use and value of the land.170 Second, the regulation needs
to be permanent, meaning that the land has no future value.171
For a fee simple, this would mean that the land would be unable
to be used in an economically beneficial way and that the regu-
lation would be intended to be permanent-no value would exist
in the future, and no buyer would be interested in purchasing
the property. 17 2
168 See Part III.A.1.
169 See Part I.B.2.
170 See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 329-30.
171 See id at 330-32.
172 See Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 328 (cited in note 27) ("The fact that a restriction is
thought at the outset to be permanent, but is later rescinded or otherwise becomes temporary,
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What would it mean for a lease to be completely deprived of
all economic value? Intuitively, a regulation depriving property
of all economically beneficial use would have the same effect on
both a leaseholder and a landowner with respect to the present
use of the land.173 A regulation permanently depriving land of
economically beneficial use would cause a lease, like a fee sim-
ple, to lose all future value. Moreover, it would seem that a regu-
lation that was only temporary, but that completely covered a
lease, could also be thought of as permanently depriving the
lease of all future value, because the lease would be unusable for
the entirety of its remaining period.
This analysis, however, does not take into account options,
such as the right to renew or extend the lease or an option to
purchase the landlord's interest,174 which are common in leas-
es.175 These types of options would allow the leaseholder to exer-
cise the option to continue the lease after the agreed upon dura-
tion has expired.176 Critically, they may also allow the
leaseholder to outlast a temporary moratorium.
Further, lease options are generally considered to be proper-
ty interests under the Takings Clause.1' These options add val-
ue to the lease. In Alamo Land & Cattle Co v Arizona,178 the
affects only the nature of the property interest allegedly taken, not the applicable tak-
ings test.").
173 This assumes that the lease does not contain an indemnification clause or a
clause cancelling the lease in the event of a taking.
174 See Richard R. Powell and Michael Allan Wolf, 2 Powell on Real Property
§§ 16B.05[4]-[5] at 16B-98-119 (Bender 2012). Even though renewals, extensions, and
similar lease extenders have slightly different common law consequences, see id at
§§ 16B.05[4][a]-[c] at 16B-98-111, for this analysis I lump them all under the category
of renewals.
175 See Mark S. Dennison, Lessee's Right to Enforce Option to Renew or Purchase as
Affected by Breach of Lease, 88 Am Jur Trials 63 §§ 1-2 (2003) (noting that "[m]ost leases
of real property contain some type of provision granting the lessee the option to renew or
extend the lease at the end of the term" and that "[1]eases [] frequently contain provi-
sions conferring upon the lessee the option to purchase the leased premises"); Alvin L.
Arnold and Jeanne O'Neill, 1 Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual § 3:1 (West 2013)
("The option to renew is a common feature in commercial leases."); William A. Hancock,
ed, Special Study for Corporate Counsel on Commercial Leases § 1:25 (Business Laws
2000) ("Many commercial leases contain a renewal option.").
176 See Powell and Wolf, 2 Powell on Real Property § 16B.05[4][al at 16B-98-99,
§ 16B.05[51 at 16B-111-19 (cited in note 174).
177 See, for example, Forest Properties, Inc v United States, 39 Fed Cl 56, 70 (1997)
("The United States Supreme Court [ ] has confirmed that contract rights are a form of
property within the purview of the Fifth Amendment."). See also Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at
319 (cited in note 27) (noting that "the recent trend favors property status" for "some of
the more insubstantial interests in land, such as options to purchase").
178 424 US 295 (1976).
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Court included the right to renew as part of the valuation of the
lease.179 Similarly, in United States v 53 1/4 Acres of Land, More
or Less, in Borough of Brooklyn, Kings County, NY,180 the Second
Circuit noted that a right to renewal was a compensable interest
in a condemnation proceeding.181 In Petty Motor, the Court noted
that "[t]he value of the remainder of the term of the Petty Motor
Company's lease includes the value of the right to a renewal."182
As leases with these sorts of options have value, the question
thus becomes whether this value is the "token interest" in
Palazzolo,183 in which case Lucas still applies, or if there is only
a substantial devaluation as discussed in Tahoe-Sierra, which
requires the Penn Central balancing test.184
There should be little question that an option to purchase is
more than a token interest. An option to purchase gives the
leaseholder the right to become an owner in fee simple, and Ta-
hoe-Sierra has made clear that the Penn Central test is the re-
quired approach when a moratorium burdens a fee simple. Even
if the leaseholder was not interested in exercising the purchase
option, sufficient value would still exist because the leaseholder
could sell the land to someone else.185
Rights to renew are more difficult, because the facts in a
specific case are more variable.186 Assuming that the leaseholder
could use the right to renew, the question becomes whether, in
the abstract, this would be a token interest or something more.
Although it is difficult to articulate a clear distinction between
the two, an examination of the case law is instructive.
When courts hold that there is a Lucas taking, it is because
all possible uses of land are nonviable. For example, in Resource
Investments, Inc v United States,81 the court found that there
was a complete deprivation when owners were denied the ability
179 See id at 304.
180 139 F2d 244 (2d Cir 1943).
181 See id at 247.
182 Petty Motor, 327 US at 380-81.
183 For a description of the use of "token interest" in Palazzolo, see note 48 and ac-
companying text.
184 See Part I.B.
185 See note 139.
186 For example, the renewal period itself may not extend past the moratorium or
the lessee may have had to move to another location, with the transaction costs being so
high that returning is not a feasible option. In these scenarios, the right to renew is basi-
cally worthless.
187 85 Fed Cl 447 (2009).
20332013]1
The University of Chicago Law Review
to build a landfill.188 Looking at the other possible uses of the
land, the court said that other possible uses theoretically exist-
ed, but would be so expensive to implement as to not be econom-
ically feasible.189 The court wrote that even though "a parcel will
typical [sic] retain some quantum of value even without econom-
ically viable use," this "scintilla of value" is not enough to avoid
a Lucas takings claim.190 In these instances, possessors of prop-
erty interests are left just with a "token interest" and can there-
fore still be compensated under the Lucas rule.191
However, courts do not find a complete deprivation of bene-
ficial value when the deprivation is "one step short of com-
plete."192 In other words, if there is some viable use for the land,
Lucas doesn't apply. For example, in Palazzolo, the Court did
not find a Lucas taking when a landowner was able to build only
a single-family residence on an eighteen-acre parcel.193 The
Court did not believe that the regulation at issue left the land
"economically idle."194 Even if land value undergoes a substantial
devaluation, as long as that devaluation is one step short of
complete, the Lucas per se rule is inapplicable.195
Rights to renew are more like the situation in Palazzolo
than the situation in Resource Investments for two reasons.
First, the ability of a leaseholder to use his or her land once the
moratorium ends is a viable option, even if the lease itself suf-
fers a substantial devaluation. This use is more than the token
interest left over in Lucas cases, in which any value left is
impractical and unworkable.196 Second, rights to renewal have
188 Id at 493.
189 Id at 489.
190 Id at 488.
191 Resource Investments, 85 Fed Cl at 488, citing Palazzolo, 533 US at 631.
192 Lucas, 505 US at 1019 n 8. See also Meltz, 34 Ecol L Q at 331-32 (cited in note 27).
193 See Palazzolo, 533 US at 631.
194 Id (quotation marks omitted), quoting Lucas, 505 US at 1019.
195 See Lucas, 505 US at 1019 n 8. The amount of devaluation necessary to move
from a substantial devaluation to leaving only a token interest is very high. See id (using
the term "one step short of complete" in reference to a 95 percent devaluation of value of
a parcel). However, a court's finding that the devaluation is "one step short of complete"
does not preclude a finding that the government regulation was a taking. The Court in
Lucas criticized the dissent's assumption "that the landowner whose deprivation is one
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation," because even though the "owner
might not be able to claim the benefit of [the] categorical formulation," this would be
taken into account in the Penn Central balancing test. Id. See also note 111 and accom-
panying text.
196 See Arnold and O'Neill, 1 Real Estate Leasing Practice Manual at § 3:1 (cited in
note 175) (explaining that the "option to renew" is "a valuable right to the lessee," for
which a lessee may even make concessions).
2034 [80:2005
Taking Leases
been found by the courts to be valuable in and of themselves.
While rights to renew have not been analyzed as adding value in
the context of a Lucas claim, a tenant who is improperly denied
rights to renew can generally get expectation damages or specif-
ic performance in court, as with any other breach of contract.197
A lease that expires during a moratorium likely will be una-
ble to satisfy the Lucas test because options present in the lease
mean that the moratorium did not eliminate all beneficial value
from the lease. As the presence of some beneficial value would
make the Lucas test inapplicable, the Penn Central test is the
best approach for most leases subsumed by moratoria.
C. The Outliers and the Lucas Rule
This Comment argues that, in most instances, the nature of
leases means that the Penn Central balancing test is the best
approach when a lease expires during a moratorium. However,
the bright-line rule introduced in Part III.A.2 posits that when
no prior use exists, the proper analytical framework is the Lucas
per se rule. The discussion in Part III.B adds a second layer,
that options need to be either nonexistent or insufficient to add
more than a token interest. While a scenario like this would
rarely occur, this would be the "extraordinary circumstance"
that would trigger the Lucas rule.198
CONCLUSION
Takings law is a complex field, and it is often unclear which
theory or precedent a court should apply for a specific factual
scenario. This Comment addresses one open question in takings
jurisprudence. When a lease is entirely subsumed by a morato-
rium, the proper approach a court should employ is the Penn
Central balancing test.
197 See 49 Am Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant § 190 (2013).
198 Commentators have argued that applying the Lucas rule for leases subsumed by
temporary moratoria could lead to negative strategic behavior by landowners. See, for
example, Strahilevitz, 104 Mich L Rev at 1862 n 98 (cited in note 106) (noting that the
ruling in Tahoe-Sierra could allow landowners to manufacture a takings claim). Howev-
er, while dissenting opinions have worried about strategic behavior arising from Lucas,
see, for example, Palazzolo, 533 US at 655 (Breyer dissenting) (arguing that a takings
rule should not be created that encourages strategic behavior); Lucas, 505 US at 1065
(Stevens dissenting) ("[D]evelopers and investors may market specialized estates to take
advantage of the [Lucas] rule."), no majority opinion has ever endorsed the idea that the
Lucas rule should be limited in light of strategic behavior concerns.
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While this view is potentially contrary to the initial reac-
tions of many scholars in the field, the Penn Central test is supe-
rior on numerous levels. It offers the best fit with the language
and doctrine of Tahoe-Sierra, and in most instances a lease will
have options that will cause the value to extend beyond the
moratorium, making Lucas inapplicable at the outset.
On a broader level, applying Penn Central when a leasehold
is completely consumed by a moratorium further calls into doubt
the impact of the test in Lucas199 Lucas is now almost complete-
ly confined to its facts. Even in the context of leases, a Lucas
taking will be found, as the Court has said, only in an "extraor-
dinary case."200
199 Underkuffler, 21 Const Commen at 753 (cited in note 14) ("In the past few years,
the hegemony enjoyed by [the Lucas view] has crumbled. After Palazzolo and Tahoe, no
longer will the idea of property . . . mark, with certainty, where protected individual in-
terests end and collective power begins.").
200 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 US at 332.
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